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An Economic Model of Mortality Salience in  
Personal Financial Decision Making:  
Applications to Annuities, Life Insurance,  
Charitable Gifts, Estate Planning, Conspicuous 
Consumption, and Healthcare 
  
Russell N. James, III 
Texas Tech University 
 
 
The study of personal mortality salience and the denial of death have a long history in 
psychology leading to the modern field of Terror Management Theory. However, a simple 
consumer utility function predicts many of the outcomes identified in experimental research 
in this field. Further, this economic approach explains a range of otherwise unexpected 
financial decision-making behaviors in areas as diverse as annuities, life insurance, charitable 
gifts and bequests, intra-family gifts and bequests, conspicuous consumption, and healthcare.  
With its relevance to such a wide range of personal financial decisions, understanding the 
impact of mortality salience can be particularly useful to advisors in related fields. 
 




“I intend to live forever. So far, so good.” 
– Comedian Steven Wright 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 A long history of work in psychology – beginning with Otto Rank (1941/2011), 
popularized by Ernest Becker (1973), and experimentally tested for decades by modern 
researchers (Burke, Martens, & Faucher, 2010) – called Terror Management Theory (TMT) 
suggests that humans treat personal mortality awareness far differently than other types of 
objective information.  This paper proposes that a simple consumer utility function 
predicts many behaviors identified in TMT experimental research and provides insight into 
a wide range of otherwise perplexing behaviors with relevance to financial decision 
making.  Understanding the sometimes unexpected implications of the model for financial 
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decisions involving contemplation of personal mortality can generate practically useful 
strategies for advisors seeking to understand and assist clients in advancing personal and 
family well-being.  
 
MORTALITY SALIENCE IN PSYCHOLOGY 
 
Originally rooted in complex notions of post-Freudian psychoanalysis, TMT suggests 
that the awareness of impending death creates anxiety or “terror,” and the central task of 
various psychological constructs is to manage this fear (Becker, 1973; Rank, 1941/2011).  
A modern extension of these concepts holds that personal mortality salience generates two 
types of defenses: first, avoidance, and second, pursuit of symbolic immortality 
(Pyszczynski, Greenberg, & Solomon, 1999). 
 
Initial Avoidance  
 
In general, people express an aversion to focusing on their own death.  In a standard 
work on the psychology of death, Kastenbaum (2000, p. 98) explains that there is “general 
agreement that most of us prefer to minimize even our cognitive encounters with death.”  
Avoiding personal mortality related thoughts can be accomplished in a number of ways 
such as distraction (Greenberg, Pyszczynski, Solomon, Simon, & Breus, 1994), active 
suppression (Arndt, Greenberg, Solomon, Pyszczynski, & Simon, 1997), or biasing 




Beyond this general tendency towards avoidance, experimentally-induced mortality 
reminders actually increase subsequent tendencies to suppress death-related interactions 
(Arndt et al., 1997; Greenberg et al., 2000).  For example, experimentally-induced mortality 
reminders lead to increased denial of personal characteristics said to result in early death 




Avoidance, however, is not a complete solution to managing the fear of death 
because the inevitable reality of mortality persists. As a second defense, people may engage 
in the pursuit of symbolic immortality.  Pyszczynski, Greenberg, and Solomon (1999) 
explained, “the hope of symbolic immortality is provided by enabling individuals to feel a 
part of something larger, more powerful, and more eternal than themselves, such as the 
family, church, nation, corporation, or other enduring social entities” (p. 836). Although the 
person will die, some impact will live on through one’s surviving in-group, making the 
support and maintenance of the in-group particularly important.   
 
Accordingly, mortality salience increases the desire to be remembered by and to 
support one’s surviving in-group members, and to oppose surviving out-group members.  
The increased desire for remembrance can be seen in that mortality reminders increase the 
desire for fame (Greenberg, Kosloff, Solomon, Cohen, & Landau, 2010), the perception of 
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one’s past significance (Landau, Greenberg, & Sullivan, 2009), and even the interest in 
naming a star after one’s self (Greenberg et al., 2010). Increased willingness to support 
one’s in-groups, and resist out-groups, can be seen in the effect of mortality reminders on 
increasing negative ratings by Americans of anti-US essays (Burke et al., 2010), increasing 
German preference for the German mark instead of the euro (Jonas, Fritsche, & Greenberg, 
2005), increasing the predicted success of the national soccer team (Dechesne, Greenberg, 
Arndt, & Schimel, 2000), increasing negative ratings of foreign candy (Friese & Hoffmann, 
2008), and increasing support for more nationalistic political figures (Burke et al., 2010).   
 
Although these core TMT principles do not cover the wide range of complexities, 
causes, and implications found in the field, they represent important points of agreement 
well supported by experimental results. The next section demonstrates how similar 
principles, as well as others, arise from an economic approach using a simple consumer 
utility function. 
 
AN ECONOMIC MODEL OF CONSUMPTION WITH DEATH DENIAL 
 
Definition of the Economic Model 
 
Following Brunnermeier and Parker (2005), consumers maximize expected well-
being, defined both by current circumstances and by expectations regarding future 
circumstance at each period. The inclusion of expectations of the future as an independent 
source of current well-being leads to a divergence between optimal expectations and 
rational expectations.  Brunnermeier and Parker (2005) explained, “optimal beliefs trade 
off the incentive to be optimistic in order to increase expected future utility against the 
costs of poor outcomes that result from decisions made based on optimistic beliefs” (p. 
1096).  
  
In the simplest model incorporating anticipatory utility, the consumer in a two 
period game seeks to maximize felicity, W, where c1 is current consumption, δ is the 
discount function for anticipatory utility from subjectively estimated future consumption, 
ĉ2, and β is the discount function for actual future consumption, c2.  As a simple illustration, 
the purchase of a new pair of designer shoes can contribute to felicity because the 
consumer can immediately wear them, u(c1), can immediately enjoy the anticipation of 
wearing them at an important future event, δu(ĉ2), and later can enjoy actually wearing 
them at the future event, βu(c2). 
   
W = u(c1) + δu(ĉ2) + βu(c2) 
 Next, following Gary Becker (1974), utility is affected not only by personal 
consumption, c, but also by the circumstances of others, R. This utility from the 
circumstances of those in one’s social environment, R, may represent either positive 
interdependence, as with a loved one, or negative interdependence, as with an enemy. 
Because future personal consumption is contingent on the consumer’s survival to the 
future period, s [0,1], anticipatory utility from future personal consumption is contingent 
on the consumer’s subjective beliefs regarding survival to the future period, ŝ [0,1]. In 
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contrast, the consumer may gain anticipatory utility from the future circumstances of 
others, R2, even in a condition where the consumer will not survive to the future period. 
Although the consumer who does not survive will be unable to personally observe and 
appreciate the circumstances of others during the future period, the consumer can still gain 
anticipatory utility from his or her impact upon those future circumstances. In this 
approach, the only element of uncertainty subject to optimism is the consumer’s subjective 
estimation of the probability of survival, ŝ, which may differ from an objective survival 
estimate, s, by incorporating death denial, d [0,1]. Thus, in this expanded form, the 
consumer seeks to maximize. 
 
W = u(c1, R1) + δu(ĉ2, R2) + sβu(c2, R2), where ĉ2 = ŝ*c2 and ŝ = s + d*(1-s) 
To return to the simple illustration, in the expanded model the consumer can also 
receive felicity by giving a new pair of designer shoes to a friend from the friend’s 
immediate use of the shoes, u(R1), from the immediate contemplation of the friend’s use of 
the shoes at an important future event, δu(R2), and later from actually observing the friend 
wearing the shoes at the future event, sβu(R2). Additionally, the expanded model 
incorporates the objective, s, and subjective, ŝ, likelihood that the consumer will survive to 
the future event. As before, the consumer may purchase a pair of shoes for his or her own 
use and immediately enjoy the anticipation of wearing them at an important future event. 
But now, that enjoyment, δu(ĉ2), depends upon the consumer’s subjective estimate of the 
likelihood of surviving to the future event, ĉ2 = ŝ*c2. In contrast, enjoyment from the 
immediate anticipation of the friend’s use of the shoes at the future event, δu(R2), is not 
dependent upon the consumer’s survival. 
 
Anticipatory utility is assumed to be non-decreasing in inputs and subject to 
diminishing marginal utility separately for anticipatory utility from expected future 
consumption, u′(ĉ2)>0 & u′′(ĉ2)<0, anticipatory utility from expected future circumstances 
of others, u′(R2)>0 & u′′(R2)<0, and combined as total anticipatory utility, resulting in 
negative cross-partials, ∂u′(ĉ2)/∂R2<0 & ∂u′(R2)/∂ĉ<0.    
 
 Finally, developing and maintaining a bias, such as death denial, is not costless but 
requires effort. Thus, an exogenous personal mortality reminder could reduce the death 
denial bias, consequently requiring additional investments to rebuild the bias to the pre-
reminder level. The consumer is constrained by a budget, B, that can be used to purchase a 
vector of market or self-produced goods and services, X. These expenditures can influence 
current personal consumption, Xc1, current circumstances of others, XR1, future 
circumstances of others, XR2, future personal consumption if the consumer survives, Xc2, 
objective survival probability, Xs, or help to bias or ignore estimates of the consumer’s 
survival probability, Xd. As in Lancaster (1966), goods are inputs in which the output is a 
collection of characteristics, and utility comes from these characteristics. Thus, a single 
good or service may have multiple impacts in each of these categories of characteristics. 
Although such characteristics may be bundled within a specific good, prices pc1, pc2, ps, pd, 
pR1, and pR2, reflect the latent unbundled price structure, assumed to be non-decreasing, for 
each separate characteristic type via current efforts and expenditures. 
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B = pc1Xc1+pc2Xc2+psXs+pdXd+pR1XR1+pR2XR2 
Current personal consumption, c1, includes the vector of characteristics of goods 
and services both from current period purchases, Xc1, and from all sources outside of 
current purchases (e.g., pre-existing capital assets or public goods). The same concept 
applies to all other budget elements. For example, the current, R1, or anticipated future, R2, 
circumstances of all others includes those generated by the consumer’s expenditures, XR1 
or XR2, and those existing outside of such expenditures. The objectively estimated 
probability of survival, s, consists of current expenditures affecting longevity, Xs, and 
mortality-related circumstances outside of such expenditures. The consumer’s level of 
death denial, d, is influenced by current efforts affecting death denial, Xd, and death denial 
circumstances outside of such efforts. As with any maximizing consumption decision, at 
equilibrium, the marginal utility from spending on any inputs will be equal for all inputs 
with a positive investment. 
 
Discussion of the Economic Model 
 
Kopczuk and Slemrod (2005) presented the only previous economic model 
explicitly incorporating death denial, explaining “we argue that anxiety associated with 
thinking about death may in some circumstances lead people to repress, or deny, news 
about their mortality” (p. 2). The current approach differs from Kopczuk and Slemrod’s 
(2005) model in several ways, including incorporating the consumer’s social environment, 
R1 and R2, and removing the requirement for an a priori assumption that death 
contemplation must cause anxiety (although allowing that such a reaction would be likely). 
   
Death denial need not mean that a consumer is unable to estimate accurate survival 
probabilities, only that he or she does not always apply such estimates in specific 
consumption decisions when optimism is the felicity-maximizing subjective expectation for 
that decision.  The idea that people routinely apply rosier predictions about their own 
future than is objectively warranted (i.e., “optimism bias”) is not new (Sharot, 2011), nor is 
an economic model that explicitly allows for information repression and self-deception in 
support of these self-serving beliefs (Bénabou & Tirole, 2002). Similarly, the idea that 
people can invest effort to increase their appreciation of a future event is not new to 
economics (Becker & Mulligan, 1997; Böhm-Bawerk, 1891). Allowing death denial suggests 
that by similar means a person may put forth effort to decrease appreciation of a specific 
future event (i.e., his or her death). 
   
The effort spent in biasing applied mortality estimates cannot be used for other 
production or leisure activities, and thus is subject to a personal time and effort budget 
constraint. As in previous approaches (Becker & Mulligan, 1997; Bénabou & Tirole, 2002), 
such efforts may include laboring to enhance the vividness of optimistic imaginations, 
purposeful information repression, and the active avoidance of undesirable reminders. 
 
In addition to such personal efforts, spending money on certain goods or services 
can aid in death denial. For example, quack medicine or placebo treatments often provide a 
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plausible story, a convincing “expert,” and a community of followers, all of which may 
facilitate biasing mortality estimates or avoiding death contemplation.   
 
Derivation of TMT and Other Predictions from the Economic Model 
As derived by Brunnermeier and Parker (2005), incorporating anticipatory utility 
leads to optimism bias in predicting future circumstances. Where optimism regarding 
future survival is optimally present (d>0), exogenously reducing this optimism, such as by 
a morality salience reminder, lowers anticipated future period personal consumption by 
reducing the survival estimate, ŝ, applied to future consumption. This reduces utility from 
current period anticipation of future circumstances.1 Consequently, if re-establishing 
optimism is costly (pd>0), the consumer will avoid engaging with mortality salient topics 
that lower death denial unless there is an offsetting gain in objective longevity, s, 
consumption, c1 or c2, or social environment, R1 or R2. This corresponds with “initial 
avoidance” in TMT. 
 
A shock that exogenously lowers death denial, d, lowers the subjective probability of 
survival to the future period, ŝ, and thereby lowers subjectively estimated future 
consumption ĉ2. Because the anticipatory utility from this subjectively estimated future 
consumption, ĉ2, is subject to diminishing marginal utility, u′(ĉ2)>0, the immediate marginal 
utility of ĉ2, and thus inputs d and s, will rise. However, this may not occur for the input of 
future consumption, c2, as the drop in death denial itself, d, reduces the effectiveness of this 
input in generating subjectively estimated future consumption, ĉ2, and hence in generating 
anticipatory utility.  Additionally, the diminishing marginal utility of overall combined 
anticipatory utility, δu(ĉ2, R2), also raises the immediate marginal utility of input R2 (this 
from the negative cross-partial, ∂u′(R2)/∂ĉ < 0). Thus, the exogenous shock should increase 
investments in pdXd, psXs, and/or pR2XR2 relative to investments in pc1Xc1, pc2Xc2, and pR1XR1. 
The increased investment in pdXd corresponds with “induced avoidance” in TMT. The 
increased investment in pR2XR2 corresponds with pursuit of “symbolic immortality” 
(increased support for in-group members and resistance to out-group members) in TMT. 
   
Beyond replicating these core predictions from TMT, this approach suggests 
additional implications with regard to objective longevity, s. Because objective survival 
probability, s, and death denial, d, are similar inputs to the subjective probability of 
survival, ŝ, reducing the objective probability of survival, s, such as through aging or health 
shocks, should have effects similar to experimental manipulations that reduce death denial, 
d. As described above, such exogenous reductions in d (or s) would generate increased 
investment in psXs, pdXd, and/or pR2XR2. The choice of which depends upon the relative cost 
and effectiveness of each.  
 
                                                          
1 This still holds when survival contingent transfers of goods originally intended for c2, i.e., bequests, 
are allowed.  Such transfers result in lost utility whenever the desire for own future consumption, c2, differs 
from the desire for future impact on another, R2.  For example, another may inherit clothes purchased for the 
consumer’s use, but this transfer will likely generate less anticipated utility than a comparable purchase 
originally intended for the other’s future use.   
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The increased marginal utility of R2 relative to c1, c2, or R1 would increase the 
relative desire for future social impact as objective longevity falls. But, the relationship with 
s and d is more complex. Death denial, d, and objective survival probability, s, are 
substitutes that crowd each other out, ŝ = s+d*(1-s). At the extreme, a person with 100% 
death denial would receive no anticipatory utility benefit from improving objective 
longevity (e.g., via health-related investments or reducing risky behaviors). Conversely, 
improvements to objective longevity generate the greatest anticipatory utility impact when 
death denial does not exist. This trade-off is particularly important when pursuit of each is 
mutually exclusive. For example, getting tested for a life-threatening disease or accepting 
the mortality dangers of one’s risky behaviors would likely generate higher mortality 
salience, thus lowering d, but could also increase objective longevity, s, due to early 
detection or behavioral changes. A person who believes he or she can have little additional 
impact on his or her health (i.e., perceives a high or unattainable marginal cost structure for 
psXs) would be relatively more likely to invest in death denial, pdXd.   
 




 Planning for retirement with a fixed sum of money presents a challenge in large part 
because of statistical uncertainty about the duration of life. For example, about 20% of 65-
year olds in the U.S. will live fewer than ten years, but another 20% will live 25 or more 
years (Lockwood, 2012). Economists have long held that the optimal solution involves the 
purchase of annuities (Benartzi, Previtero, & Thaler, 2011; Yaari, 1965). Yet, consumers 
rarely take advantage of this potentially optimal financial choice, with only about 3.6% of 
recent retirees having purchased any life annuities (Lockwood, 2012). This behavioral 
conundrum has been dubbed the “annuity puzzle” and explaining it “has proven so difficult 
as to prompt a search for explanations outside the rational model” (Lockwood, 2012, p. 
226). 
 
If annuity contemplation generates increased personal mortality salience, and thus 
potentially decreased death denial, the implications of the proposed model become 
relevant.  Given that an annuity involves an explicit bet on one’s own longevity, such an 
effect is logical.  Salisbury and Nenkov (2016) demonstrated this experimentally. 
Participants rated either the likelihood that at age 65 they would put accumulated savings 
into an IRA or the likelihood that at age 65 they would put accumulated savings into an 
annuity. When asked to list the thoughts going through their mind during the decision, 1% 
of those in the IRA condition spontaneously mentioned death-related thoughts, as 
compared with 40% of those in the annuity condition.   
 
By the initial avoidance implication, this mortality salience feature of annuities 
would create consumer resistance. To test this causal link, Salisbury and Nenkov (2016) 
varied the description of annuities to increase mortality salience by replacing “each year 
you live” with “each year you live until you die”, and “if the annuity holder lives up to 
different ages” with “depending on the age when the annuity holder dies” (p. 7). This 
change increased mortality salience. A higher share of respondents reported death-related 
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thoughts during the annuity decision process, including the death terms. Further, this 
increase in death-related thoughts generated a lower interest in purchasing annuities. 
Mediation analysis confirmed that the reduction in interest generated by the annuity 
description change was fully mediated by the change in death-related thoughts (Salisbury 
& Nenkov, 2016).   
 
The induced avoidance implication suggests that other death reminders should make 
annuities – themselves a reminder of mortality – even less attractive. Salisbury and Nenkov 
(2016) also found this to be true. In a separate experiment, participants were randomly 
assigned to write an essay about either dental pain or their own death before indicating 
their interest in purchasing an annuity at age 65. Among those who first wrote about their 
own death, only 23% expressed interest in purchasing an annuity at age 65, while 41% of 
the comparison group did so.   
 
 The symbolic immortality implication suggests an additional reason for resistance to 
a standard annuity. This implication holds that a death reminder, such as annuity 
contemplation, should increase the relative desire for future social impact, R2. But, a 
standard annuity protects lifetime consumption, c1 and c2, at the cost of a bequest transfer – 
a form of future social impact - R2.  Increasing bequest motivation will decrease interest in 
standard annuities (Friedman & Warshawsky, 1990; Lockwood, 2012). This might also 
explain why about three-fourths of all annuities owned by recent retirees actually contain 
bequest benefits, or survivor benefits (Lockwood, 2012). 
 
A contrary argument is that the presence of death denial should lead to excessive 
annuity purchases, given optimistic estimations of longevity. However, because such 
optimism is limited by objective impact on future outcomes, sβu(c2, R2), within the limited 
context of this significant investment choice lowering death denial becomes maximizing, 
thus preventing excessive purchases. After such a choice not to invest, however, the 
consumer is left worse off, having lowered death denial below what is optimal outside of 
the limited context of this significant investment choice. Thus, the maximizing approach is 




 The purchase of life insurance represents another behavioral “puzzle.” Relative to 
their risk exposure, older adults tend to be over-insured, while younger families tend to be 
under-insured (Chambers, Schlagenhauf, & Young, 2011). Based on standard consumption 
smoothing models, the peak value for life insurance arises at age 30, yet the propensity to 
own life insurance actually peaks in the late 60s (Chambers et al., 2011). In a study of life 
insurance holdings by those in their 50s and early 60s, nearly half of married people “were 
protected by life insurance even though they faced no underlying vulnerabilities” 
(Bernheim, Fornie, Gokhale, & Kotlikoff, 2003, p. 360). In contrast, another study found that 
among secondary earners in their 20s and 30s, only one-in-five “held sufficient life 
insurance to avert significant or severe financial consequences” (Bernheim, Carman, 
Gokhale, & Kotlikoff, 2003, p. 532). The authors summarized succinctly, “life insurance is 
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essentially uncorrelated with financial vulnerability at every stage in the life cycle” 
(Bernheim et al., 2003, p. 531).   
 
Purchasing term life insurance is, in essence, pure death planning, suggesting that 
contemplation of such purchases would generate mortality salience. Fransen, Fennis, 
Pruyn, and Das (2008) confirmed this experimentally, finding that simply exposing 
participants to a life insurance company logo increased their mortality salience. Similarly, 
Rockloff, Browne, Li, and O’Shea (2014) used a question about owning a life insurance 
policy to trigger mortality salience. 
 
By the initial avoidance implication, the mortality salience feature of life insurance 
would lead consumers to resist, and hence delay, the initial purchase of life insurance. Yet, if 
a consumer had a long-standing policy, contemplating cancellation might also heighten 
mortality salience, creating resistance and delay even when the original need had 
disappeared.  Separately, advancing age reduces objective longevity, s, increasing the 
marginal utility of investing in future social impact, pR2XR2, such as through a life insurance 
bequest, relative to other investments, pc1Xc1, pc2Xc2, or pR1XR1. 
 
Combining the initial avoidance and symbolic immortality implications may explain 
why life insurance is “sold and not bought” (Bernheim et al., 2003, p. 354). Consumers will 
tend to avoid decision making that induces mortality salience, such as contemplating life 
insurance purchases. However, if a salesperson were able to induce mortality salience – by 
forcing contemplation of life insurance or otherwise – then the consumer’s attraction to the 
bequest benefit, R2, of the product would increase. This results in a product that could be 
“sold” even if, without a salesperson, it would not be “bought.” However, to the extent that 
such salespeople are associated with death contemplation, the initial avoidance implication 
suggests that consumers will tend to avoid them. This may explain the tendency for life 
insurance agents to adopt substitute titles such as financial advisor (Rosh, 2015). Further, 
it may help to explain the relative attraction of whole life products that allow for initial 
discussion of non-death-related savings goals, albeit with an ancillary death-related 




 Charitable gifts are one method of making investments in the circumstances of 
others, such as improving others’ welfare or improving others’ opinions of the donor. The 
symbolic immortality implication suggests that inducing mortality salience will increase the 
marginal utility of investments in future social impact, pR2XR2, relative to current, pc1Xc1, or 
future, pc2Xc2, consumption experiences. Correspondingly, experimental research has found 
that death reminders increased giving and favorability toward charities that support one’s 
social affiliations (Jonas, Schimel, Greenberg, & Pyszczynski, 2002) or one’s salient social 
norms (Jonas, Sullivan, & Greenberg, 2013). Further, death reminders increased 
satisfaction resulting from sharing money with others (Zaleskiewicz, Gasiorowska, & 
Kesebir, 2015). 
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 The same implication suggests that inducing mortality salience will increase the 
marginal utility of investments in future social impact, pR2XR2, relative to immediate social 
impact, pR1XR1. Wade-Benzoni, Tost, Hernandez, and Larrick (2012) provided an 
experimental test of this concept. Participants were entered into a drawing for $1,000 and 
were given the opportunity to pre-commit some of their potential winnings to a charity 
benefiting people in impoverished communities. Half of the participants read that the 
charity was “focused on meeting the immediate needs of people in those communities.” The 
other half read that the charity was “focused on creating lasting improvements that would 
benefit people in those communities in the future.” Thus, the two descriptions roughly 
corresponded to the R1 and R2 concepts of the proposed model. Half of those in each group 
were exposed to a death reminder prior to making the charitable giving decision. For those 
not exposed to a death reminder, the description focused on immediate social impact 
generated a higher average gift amount ($257.77) than the description focused on lasting 
improvements ($100.00), pR1XR1>pR2XR2. However, under mortality salience, the description 
focused on immediate social impact generated a lower average gift amount ($80.97) than 
the description focused on lasting improvements ($223.98), pR1XR1<pR2XR2. Therefore, this 
result corresponds with the model’s implication that inducing mortality salience will 
increase the desire for future social impact, R2, relative to immediate social impact, R1.   
 
 Separately, the popularity of charitable gift annuities, estimated to hold $15-$20 
billion (Behan & Clontz, 2005) despite their low return and high risk relative to commercial 
annuities, may be explained, in part, by an increased desire for future social impact, R2, 
generated by the mortality salience inherent in annuity contemplation. A charitable gift 
annuity allows a donor to purchase fixed lifetime payments, lower than those available for 
commercial annuities, from the charity that, depending upon the state of issuance, may 
have no reserves to support the payments (American Council on Gift Annuities, 2016). 
Nevertheless, because any unused portion benefits the charitable organization at the death 
of the annuitant, a charitable gift annuity provides the future social impact, R2, missing 




The initial avoidance implication is consistent with the underutilization of estate 
planning documents. In the U.S., roughly half of adults age 55 and over have no estate 
planning documents (James, 2015). If this implication is influential then using descriptions 
limiting death references should increase interest, just as with annuity descriptions 
(Salisbury & Nenkov, 2016). James (2016) found experimentally that avoiding extraneous 
death-related terms when describing a charitable bequest gift significantly increased 
interest in making such gifts.   
 
                                                          
2 The symbolic immortality implication may also explain why it is rare for a donor to either purchase 
a commercial annuity with cash and donate the price difference to a charity, or to request that the charity 
immediately spend the actuarial estimated residual rather than waiting for the donor’s death.  As compared 
with the typical charitable gift annuity, both would exchange future charitable benefit, R2, for immediate 
charitable benefit, R1. 
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Poterba (2001) and Kopczuk and Slemrod (2003) demonstrated that those with 
taxable estates substantially underutilize the significant tax advantages of making 
immediate gifts to family members in place of bequest transfers. Kopczuk and Slemrod 
(2005) attributed this to “the refusal to face up to one’s mortality” (p. 19), which fits with 
the initial and induced avoidance implications of the current model. In addition, estate 
planning increases mortality salience, which, by the symbolic immortality implication, 
increases the value of investments in future social impact, pR2XR2, such as a bequest gift to 
family members, relative to investments in immediate social impact, pR1XR1, such as a 
current gift to family members. This implication corresponds not only with the 
underutilization of tax advantaged immediate gifts in estate planning, but also with the 
common form of these transfers. In practice, taxpayers often access these tax advantages 
by making current gifts to an irrevocable life insurance trust or a dynasty trust that will not 
benefit the recipient until well after the donor’s death (Willms, 2000). Thus, in accordance 
with the symbolic immortality implication, the taxpayer uses the tax benefit of immediate 
gifting, R1, but does so in a way that generates only a future benefit to heirs, R2. 
 
These future circumstances of others, R2, may also include others’ opinions of the 
consumer even when the consumer is deceased at the future time. Such opinions 
commonly relate to compliance with or violation of socially accepted norms. Thus, social 
norm reminders may have a heightened importance in a mortality salient decision context 
such as estate planning. Correspondingly, in the United Kingdom, Sanders, Halpern, and 
Service (2013) found that inclusion of a charitable bequest increased more than three-fold 
when the drafting professional included a social norm statement by mentioning, “many of 
our customers like to leave money to charity in their will” (p. 22). In the United States, 
James (2016) reported a similar effect for a social norm statement in the charitable bequest 
context.   
 
Conspicuous Consumption  
 
 Some goods may have benefits both from personal consumption experience and 
from their effect on others. Wong (1997, p. 197) defined conspicuous consumption as a 
circumstance “in which product satisfaction is derived from audience reaction rather than 
utility in use.”  A luxury good or socially-conscious good (e.g., those with fair trade labels or 
associated charitable transfers) may be desired in part because it affects others opinions of 
the consumer, or because it encourages others to adopt socially beneficial practices. The 
portion of this social impact that continues into the future is a form of R2. 
 
 The symbolic immortality implication suggests that mortality salience will shift 
preferences toward those products with elements of desirable future social impact, R2, 
relative to those products with only personal consumption characteristics, c1 and c2. 
Accordingly, Kasser and Sheldon (2000) found that mortality salience increased plans to 
purchase luxury products in the future. Others have found that mortality salience increased 
the desire for luxury products – Lexus car, Jaguar car, Rolex watch, famously expensive 
sweets, or other luxury brands – but not for products without such features – economy car, 
potato chips, or non-luxury brands (Heine, Harihara, & Niiya, 2002; Mandel & Heine, 1999; 
van Bommel, O'Dwyer, Zuidgeest, & Poletiek, 2015). 
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The same effect can be seen for socially-conscious purchases. Mortality salience, 
when combined with reminders of pro-environmental social norms, increased the desire 
for an environmentally-friendly vehicle, Toyota Prius, and an environmentally-friendly 
reusable cup while decreasing the desire for a less environmentally-friendly vehicle, Ford 
Expedition, and a less environmentally-friendly disposable cup (Fritsche, Jonas, Kayser, & 
Koranyi, 2010).  Maheswaran and Agrawal (2004) suggested that in consumer purchase 
decisions, “when mortality is salient, people are more willing to act in concert with the 
opinions of others” (p. 214). Thus with both luxury and environmentally-friendly products, 
the opinions of others – an example of a characteristic of others that can persist in the 
future even without the consumer’s survival (i.e., R2) – becomes more important as the 
result of inducing mortality salience.   
 
End-Of-Life Healthcare Spending  
 
Given that the majority of health care costs arise in the final year of life, advance 
medical directives could have a dramatic impact on survivor financial circumstances, as 
well as the fulfillment of patient desires (Horn & Meulen, 2014). Despite this potential 
impact, and free availability from medical care providers, only about 8% to 17% of adults 
over age 65 have advance directives (Musa, Seymour, Narayanasamy, Wada, & Conroy, 
2015). The underutilization of advance directives is consistent with the mortality-salience 
avoidance implications of the current approach. 
 
If the avoidance implications are relevant, then de-emphasizing death-focused 
language should be useful. Experimental research has found such framing to be influential 
not only in death-related financial decisions, such as annuities (Salisbury & Nenkov, 2016) 
and charitable bequests (James, 2016), but also in medical decisions. For example, people 
are more willing to accept a treatment presented as having a 90% chance of survival than 
one presented as having a 10% chance of death (McNeil, Pauker, Sox, & Tversky, 1982). 
Accordingly, Payne, Prentice-Dunn, and Allen (2009) found that a more death-focused, 
threatening intervention was less successful in generating completed advance directives 
than a positive intervention encouraging healthy aging. Discomfort with personal mortality 
can also lead healthcare workers to avoid broaching end-of-life planning discussions, with 
potentially serious negative consequences for the patient (Morrison, Morrison, & Glickman, 
1994; Volandes, 2015). Peck (2009) found that oncology social workers with greater death 
anxiety were less likely to communicate with patients about advance directives.   
 
 Contrary to those who support advance directives, Jaworska (1999) presents an 
objection based upon the inability of the current self to predict the future self’s preferences.  
Such an objection actually corresponds with the current model, which suggests that 
preferences will change as objective longevity, s, falls. Specifically, exogenous reductions in 
objective survival, s, should generate increased investment in longevity, psXs, death denial, 
pdXd, and/or future social impact, pR2XR2. The increased willingness to invest in longevity-
related healthcare, psXs, corresponds with results from Matsuyama, Reddy, and Smith 
(2006) who found that those actually facing the end of life were much more likely to choose 
extreme treatment options with small benefits than were well persons making similar 
decisions. Tsevat et al.’s (1998) finding also reflects a relatively high desire for increased 
Journal of Financial Therapy  Volume 7, Issue 2 (2016) 
ISSN: 1945-7774  
CC by–NC 4.0 2016 Financial Therapy Association 
 
  74 
longevity at the end of life; among patients aged 80 years or more who were currently in 
the hospital, over two-thirds were unwilling to trade even 10% of life expectancy in 
exchange for excellent health. Even when treatments lose their objective medical efficacy, 
they may still have value in generating false hope, or death denial. This desire for investing 
in false hope, pdXd, may help to explain Emanuel and colleagues’ (2003) finding that 
Medicaid patients nearing the end of life were just as likely to use chemotherapy whether 
or not their type of cancer was considered responsive or unresponsive to chemotherapy. 
   
 Separately, the current approach suggests an increased desire for investments in 
future impact on others, pR2XR2, resulting from diminished longevity. This is consistent with 
evidence that a terminal diagnosis can lead to a rapid shift in personal attitudes and values 
to become more other-centered, including increases in empathy, forgiveness, helping, 
compassion, and social bonding (Vail et al., 2012; Yalom, 2015). Of course, aging also 
reduces life expectancy.  Correspondingly, Schoklitsch and Baumann (2012) observed that 
generativity or “the concern in establishing and guiding the next generation” is a 
particularly important focus at older ages (p. 262).  
 
Health Promotion Using Mortality Risk 
 
In a simple rational approach, a health promotion campaign emphasizing mortality 
risk should generate immediate behavioral adjustments that enhance consumer welfare 
and longevity. However, acting on this information requires the consumer to accept his or 
her own personal mortality risk. Such acceptance runs counter to maintaining death denial, 
d. Thus, in response to the mortality salience generated by the death-focused campaign, the 
consumer could pursue longevity, s, at the cost of diminished death denial, d, or vice-versa. 
 
The choice to pursue death denial is seen in examples such as people responding to 
information about health risks by engaging in consumption, such as drinking, designed to 
dull the awareness of the health risk (Leventhal, 1970), or refusing to learn of their HIV 
status, specifically citing the desire to avoid the resulting psychological distress (Lyter, 
Valdiserri, Kingsley, Amoroso, & Rinaldo, 1987). 
 
The choice of which path to pursue, investing in either psXs or pdXd, will depend upon 
the perceived cost structure for acquiring each. Accordingly, Arndt, Routledge, and 
Goldenberg (2006) found that among women who strongly believed they could influence 
their health, death reminders increased intentions to engage in breast self-examination for 
cancer detection. But, among those who had low expectations of their ability to influence 
their health, death reminders reduced these same intentions. More generally, Witte and 
Allen (2000), in a meta-analysis of public health campaigns, found that stronger (commonly 
more mortality salient) fear appeals were simultaneously more likely to produce health-
promoting behavior and were also more likely to produce defensiveness. The determining 
factor influencing the choice of response was the consumer’s perceived efficacy in 
improving the health outcome with behavior change (Witte & Allen, 2000).  In the current 
model this perceived efficacy is represented as the perceived cost structure for psXs. 
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Thus, health promotion campaigns highlighting mortality risk may consider 
including information on the efficacy and ease of the proposed behavior change – unless 
the behavior is self-evidently easy (Kareklas & Muehling, 2014) – or alternatively, adding 
non-death related motivations (e.g., “smoking is disgusting” instead of “smoking kills”). Of 
course, avoidance does not require denying mortality risks that don’t apply to one’s self. 
This fits with experimental results finding that people are more likely to challenge the 
accuracy of negative medical information if it applies to their behavior (Kunda, 1987), or 
suggests that they are at risk (Jemmott, Ditto, & Croyle, 1986), than if it does not.   
 
Other Personal Financial Behaviors 
 
The proposed economic model has the potential to inform personal financial 
behaviors in other areas. For example, Ameriks and associates (2015) identified a “long-
term care insurance puzzle” where people hold far less insurance for nursing home 
treatment than is economically justified. However, to the extent that contemplating future 
nursing home residency triggers mortality salience, the current approach would predict 
this kind of avoidance behavior. Similarly, the relatively low level of participation in pre-
paid funeral plans (Hickey & Quinn, 2012) is unsurprising. In retirement spending, the 
current approach would suggest a particular attraction to spending no more than current 
income (from assets or otherwise), as this is the highest level of spending that does not 
require contemplation of the timing of one’s own death.   
 
IMPLICATIONS FOR FINANCIAL ADVISORS AND FINANCIAL THERAPY 
 
Financial therapy is a field that has grown from the intersection of diverse 
disciplines exploring personal finance, psychological functioning, and personal and family 
well-being. It promotes the idea that a cross-disciplinary approach can yield meaningful 
insights and useful practices. The proposed economic model of phenomena previously 
described in exclusively psychological terms demonstrates how such a cross-disciplinary 
approach can generate a remarkably wide range of potentially useful implications. 
Specifically, if many apparently disparate decisions involve a common framework when 
mortality is salient, then similar interventions may be effective across different 
applications. For example, attempts to promote estate planning may be informed by 
experiments with annuities, life insurance, advance directives, anti-smoking campaigns, 
long-term care insurance, death-related medical decisions, or even conspicuous 
consumption (and vice-versa). Such a radically cross-topical approach to addressing 
individual, ostensibly narrow, issues demonstrates the potential value of the 
multidisciplinary ethos of financial therapy.  Beyond understanding the underlying 
connectedness of a wide range of decisions that either generate or respond to mortality 
salience, the proposed model generates specific suggestions for the practice of financial 
advising and financial therapy. 
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Manage Death Avoidance with Framing 
  
The avoidance implications suggest that many people will prefer to avoid personal 
mortality reminders, especially when mortality is salient. This can cause clients to 
inappropriately avoid or postpone important death-related planning. In some cases, the 
advisor may be complicit in such avoidance either because the topic is personally aversive 
to the advisor or because the advisor wishes to avoid clients’ negative reactions.   
 
A simple step to managing this avoidance response is to reduce death-focused 
language when describing desirable planning options.  Reframing such options with 
alternate language (e.g., “as long as you live” instead of “until you die”) has consistently 
increased the attractiveness of options whether in annuities (Salisbury & Nenkov, 2016), 
estate planning (James, 2016), or healthcare decisions (McNeil, Pauker, Sox, & Tversky, 
1982).   
 
Where a death-focused planning discussion is necessary, creating the opportunity 
for such a conversation may be easier if the overall topic of discussion is not exclusively 
death-focused. Thus, the possibility of such a discussion may meet with greater acceptance 
if the advisor does not “lead with death.”  Broader financial topics (e.g., avoiding taxes, 
providing for a child’s college education, planning an ideal retirement) may function as less 
aversive introductions to death-related topics (e.g., estate tax planning, life insurance to 
protect college funding, annuities).  Such an approach can sidestep the initial avoidance 
response that might otherwise prevent the conversation from occurring at all. 
 
Anticipate the Heightened Importance of Social Impact  
 
When engaging in death-related planning topics, advisors may anticipate an 
increased interest in impact on important others, particularly long-lasting or future impact. 
Thus, advisors could frame desirable planning options to emphasize these features. 
Complex estate planning, such as dynasty trusts, spendthrift trusts, or family foundations, 
can be presented as a way to achieve a long-term future impact for the family or other 
important beneficiaries. Annuities may be presented as protecting a bequest of other assets 
from unexpected longevity, rather than simply protecting one’s lifetime income at the 
expense of the heirs. 
 
Additionally, social opinions, including social norms, become particularly significant 
in the mortality salient context as shown in experiments with consumer purchases 
(Fritsche et al., 2010), charitable giving (Jonas et al., 2013), and estate planning (James, 
2016; Sanders et al., 2013). Thus, describing what is normal, typical, or approved among 
similar others can be influential. Likewise, defaults may be powerful in this context as they 
provide both a cue of social norms (important in the symbolic immortality implication) and 
a simple mechanism to make an immediate choice that avoids further contemplation of the 
death-related topic (important in the avoidance implications). As an example of the power 
of defaults in a death-related context, Johnson and Goldstein (2003) found that effective 
national consent rates to organ donations varied from 4%-27% when the default choice 
was “no,” but were over 99% when the default choice was “yes.”   
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Appreciate the Value of Third Party Agency  
 
The avoidance response may cause clients to postpone or resist important financial 
planning components that require contemplation of personal mortality.  However, this 
avoidance reaction applies to contemplation of one’s own mortality, not to contemplation 
of another’s mortality (when such thoughts do not create personal mortality salience).  In 
this way, a third-party advisor may be a more objective and effective decision-maker for 
the client simply because the advisor is not the client.  Thus, when an intermediary can act 
as agent for mortality salient decisions, the client may experience preferred outcomes 
without the negative utility impact from personal mortality salience. Even where such 
agency is not possible, an intermediary or advisor may rephrase or reframe a decision in 
order to reduce mortality salience, and hence reduce any negative consequences from an 




Given the wide range of potential applications of the approach, the proposed 
implications remain untested in many contexts. Future testing of concepts consistent with 
this economic approach may be both practically helpful and informative as to the validity of 
the concept in a wider range of circumstances. Although it does not encompass the wide 
range of explanations, mechanisms, and motivations encompassed by TMT, the proposed 
simple economic approach may prove to have substantial explanatory power for a diverse 
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